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ACTS
The concept, 'act,' is a fundamental one in legal science.
Every legal relation of whatever sort, whether of private law or
of public law, necessarily involves for its existence an act. The
act involved, moreover, gives to a legal relation its jural charac-
ter. An act therefore is said to be the 'content' of a legal re-
lation.1 The persons (personw) of a legal relation are static
elements; but the act involved in a legal relation is a dynamic
element.2  When the involved act is performed (evolved) the
persons of the legal relation remain the same persons (under
changed jural conditions brought about by the evolution of the
act), but the act itself, after evolution, has become an historical
fact.3
Thus, if a debtor fails to pay his debt, the act of non-per-
formance accomplishes two legal results: (a) it destroys the
sanctional claim to the payment of the money; (b) it creates a
new sanctioning duty to pay damages for the breach of the
earlier duty.4 A legal relation therefore has been destroyed and
'Salmond, Jurisprudence, (3d ed. i9io) Sec. 73: "The Elements of a
Legal Right."
a Kocourelc. NTatura e specie dei rapporti giuridici, Riv. I.. D. F.. nn.
DIRIrro, 1, 21 (24) (1921).
'The terms, 'involved' and 'evolved' (or involution and evolution) are
used in a Irecise technical juristic sense. These and other related terms are
fully explained elsewhere: Kocourek. Nomic and Anomic Relations, 7 COR-ELL
LAW QLUARMTELY II, i9, n. 23 (192t).
'This results from the juristic fact that the duty to pay is, and necessarily
(33S)
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a new legal relation has been created. The evolved act, how-
ever, is no longer an element of any jural relation. It has be-
come an evidentiary historical fact, important only to furnish
proof of the jural sequence. If, on the other hand, the debtor
pays his debt, then payment is the evolution of the mesonomic
(power) relation resulting in its destruction without the sequence
of a new 'polarized' relation between the same persons.5  And,
here again, the evolved act has become a thing of the past, hav-
ing a present value only for evidentiary purposes to show what
the present situation is between the creditor and the debtor.
It is the object of this discussion to state, and, if possible
to prove two theses concerning the important concept, 'act.' The-
first thesis is that an act has no duration and that, to use a
mathematical figure, it is a point and not a line. The second
thesis is that an act is an objective situation attributed by the
law to the precedent existence or absence of a human reflex.
Since these propositions are closely interconnected we shall dis-
cuss them together.
I
The prevailing analysis of 'act' is singularly complex. That
of Holland is typical.8 According to Holland, the essential
elements of an act are: (i) an exertion of the will; (2) an ac-
companying state of consciousness; (3) a manifestation of the
will.
i. Borrowing from Zitelman, Holland paraphrases the
first element as "the psychical cause by which the motor nerves
are immediately stimulated." 7
must be, accompanied by the power (in the debtor) not to pay. The duty to
pay is the content of a zygnomic relation; and the power not to pay is the
content of a niesonomic relation. In this example, the mesonomic relation is
evolved. Cf. "Nomic and Anomic Relations" loc. cit., note 3 supra
'A 'polarized' legal relation is a so-called 'in personamt' legal r'elation.
Since all legal relations are in personaim; since, in other words, there are
legal relations only of persons and to persons, it is desirable to indicate the
juristic distinction between 'in persoham' and 'in re"' by other terms. The
terms employed here to indicate the distinction are 'polarized' and 'unpolar-
ized.' See Kocourek, Rights in Rem 68 U. OF PA. L R-v. 322 (I92o); Polar-
ized and Unpolarized Legal Relations, 9 KENTUCKY L JouR. 131 ('921).
, "Holland. Jurisprudence. (i3th ed. 1924) p. xog: "Analysis of a Right";
Mill. A System of Logic I, 59.
'Zitelmann "Irrthum und Rechtsgeschift," (x879) p. 36
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It is apparent that we have here the effort of the jurist to
assimilate, for legal purposes, the findings of the psychologists;
'but the learned author then proceeds to say that a 'juristic'
person is incapable of willing, "unless by a representative, or by
a majority of its members." 8 On this, it may be remarked that
the law is a practical science and that it need not concern itself
with motor nerves. The law, of course, must accept the findings
of psychologists, but only for evidentiary ends; for example,
to determine responsibility for a criminal act; but it is beyond
the province of the law to enter into ihe details of mental science
or to build up theories based on such details.
Again, it may be remarked, that we can see no need of
any qualification for 'juristic' persons. A 'juristic' person can
not act in any sense either mentally or physically. Juristic per-
sons can only be made accountable by imputation for the acts
of those who can at all. 9 Only human beings can act in a
juristic sense. 10  It is a fiction to say that any act can be im-
puted; 11 but it is not a fiction to hold responsible one person for
the act of another.
2. The second element in the prevailing analysis of acts is
'consciousness.' As Holland puts it, "The moral phenomena
of an exertion of will are necessarily accompanied by intellectual
phenomena." 12 It seems a broad statement to assert the neces-
sary coincidence of will and consciousness, but, since we believe
that legal science cannot be concerned with that question, it is
" Holland op. cit., p. iog.
""Von Handlungen kann bei einer juristischen Person da sie kein Mensch
ist, an und fiir sich nicht die Rede sein"; Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pan-
dektenrechts, 9th ed., (Kipp Ed. i9o6) I, sec. 59.
" In the view which cannot be elaborated here that there are only 'jur-
istic' persons in the law, it follows that responsibility for acts of human be-
ings must always be imputed. Responsibility for the act of Titius, a human
being, may be imputed to the pcrsona called Titius. When the human being
and the perrona coincide as they do for most practical purposes the distinction
may be disregarded in practice, but it exists nevertheless, and rarely it be-
comes of great technical importance as wbiere the legal pcrsona antedates or
survives the physical person. See Part III of this paper.
Terry. Leading Principles" of Anglo-American Law, (1884) sec. 88,
P. 7o: "It is an absurd fiction."
=Holland, op. cit., p. iog.
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unnecessary to attempt to survey the opinions of psychologists.
It is true, nevertheless, in the field of legal wrongs, that im-
portant categories of liability have been constructed on the basis
not only of a coincidence of will and consciousness but even of
particular kinds of consciousness. For the purposes of civil
liability, one of the most important of these categories is that of
intentional and unintentional acts. Intentional acts may be ac-
tually malicious; they may be of a kind where malice is pre-
sumed; and, lastly, they, may be simply intentional without
malice. Of the latter sort, an intentional act may be 'directly'
intentional, as where the consequence of acting determines the
will to that end; or an intentional act may be 'obliquely' inten-
tional as where the consequence is in contemplation but 'does
not determine the will to that end.'8
Non-intentional acts are commonly divided into acts of
'slight,' 'ordinary,' and 'gross' negligence; into 'culpa in con-
creto' and "culpa in. abstracto'; into 'culpa levis' and 'culpa Iata';
into advertant and inadvertant negligence; 14 and in various
European codes in other ways.1 5
In criminal law, a similar attempt is seen to classify states
of mind, especially in the legislation dealing.with homicides. In
American states, various degress of murder are commonly rec-
ognized, and manslaughter also is often classified into two or
more degrees.
These attempts to make arbitrary divisions of the functions
of the mind, we believe, are bottomed on an unworkable plan.
We do not doubt the reality of differences in the mind so far
as they are followed by external consequences, but precisely what
these differences are and how they are to be grouped and evalu-
ated are problems as to which there is no settled view among
"Bentham. Principles of M'orals and Legislation, (z789) cap. viii. The
difficulty for the law in making application of Bentham's "logic of the will"
(Principles. Preface p. xiii) is well.illustrated by the case put (chap. VIII)
of the shooting of William 11 by Sir Walter Tyrrel.
"Austin. (Lectures on Jurisprudence. 4th ed. 1873, Lect. xx, p. 438)
ays that Negligence is the inadvertent breach by omission of a positive duty;
Heedlessness is inadvertent breach of a positive duty; Rashness is the breach
of a positive duty by insufficient advertence.
"Cf. Holland op. cit. pp. 113 seq.
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psychologists. What the psychologist can not do in his own
field, the jurist can not do for him in making application of
psychical concepts. We speak of intentional and unintentional
acts in the law with the false assurance that we know just what
these terms mean; while the fact is that they represent ideas of
very great complexity21
It is almost universally accepted among lawyers that the
distinction between intentional and unintentional acts is a neces-
sary one in legal analysis. Thus, Holland says that "the state
of mind of the doer of an act is often the subject of legal
inquiry with a view to ascertaining'whether it exhibits the phe-
nomena of intention." 17 He gives as instances, intention to can-
cel a will, malice in libel, and animus furandi.
The opinions of judges and the commentaries are a unit in
the view that the concept, 'intention,' is a simple one, readily
understood, and free from ambiguity, and that the law cannot
dispense with it. To say that the idea is a highly nebulous one
is equivalent to saying that the law neither does nor can deal
accurately with it even in the field of criminal law. There is, no
doubt, an idea of 'intention' in the sense of 'willing' or 'de-
sire' or of 'purpose' which serves in current speech where most
of the terms employed lack clearness of definition; and there is
"Austin, (op. cit., Lect. xxi, p. 449) in describing intention says: "The
party wishes or wills certain of the bodily movements which immediately
follow our desires of- them; he expects or believes, at the moment of the
volition, that the bodily movements which he wills, will certainly and imme-
diately follow it; and he also expects or believes, at the moment of the voli-
tion, that some given event or events will certainly or probably follow those
bodily movements." It is sufficient to point out that by this analysis a surgeon
who operates skilfully and with some hope to cure his patient, but with the
belief that the operation will result fatally, has intended the death of his
patient.
The definition of Mr. Justice Holmes avoids the difficulty of Austin's
analysis but it introduces other problems. He says (The Common Law, [x88t]
P. 53) ". . . intent . . . will be found to resolve itself into two things: fore-
sight that certain consequences will follow from an act; and the wish for
those consequences working as a motive which induces the act." Taking
again the surgeon illustration, suppose that the surgeon believes that it wilt
be better that the patient die under an operation which has some margin of
possible success than live without an operation. ie operates skilfully believ-
ing that the chances of death probably outweigh the chances of recovery. If
the operation results fatally, has not the surgeon intended the death?
"Holland, op. cit., p. i13.
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no doubt, either, that the idea in the great bulk of instances in
the law does a rough service in the administration of practical
justice; but the fact remains that if it is an idea the exact
nature of which can not be stated, it can not function in a prac-
tical art except under the- illusion of certainty. In the law, the
illusion is not only that of certainty in the meaning of 'intention
but the greater illusion that the term functions at all. This has
been shown in a learned and convincing manner by Mr. Justice
Holmes. "All law," says Mr. Justice Holmes, "is directed to
conditions of things manifest to the senses." 18
All terms such as "mens red and the large array of words
that attempt to describe states of mind must in a scientific
analysis of legal ideas be replaced by functional ideas which
state behavioristic attitudes. For our present purpose it is suffi-
cient to repeat, that the effort of the jurist to analyze conscious-
ness is futile and unnecessary."
3. The next element in the prerailing analysis of 'act' is
the outward expression. But according to Austin "the bodily
movements which immediately follow our desires of them, are
the only human acts strictly and properly so called." 20 Mr.
Justice Holmes puts it in still a more striking way. He says "an
act is always a voluntary muscular contraction and nothing
else." 2 1 He then proceeds to say that "the chain of physical
sequences which it sets in motion . . . is no part of it
'Holmes, The Common Law (1881), p. 49. Cf. Levitt, (Origin of the
Doctrine of Mens Rea, i7 ILL. L. Rxv. 117 [ig]) who ascribes the origin
of mc, rea in the common law to the penitential books of the ninth century.
See, also, the important article of G. H. T. Malan, Behavioristic Basis of
Science of Law, 8 A. B. A. JOuL 737 seq.
"It is interesting to note that Holland who argues for the juristic neces-
sity of operating with the concept of 'intention' in criminal law and for-
'juristic acts' abandons that idea for contracts. He says (op. ci., p. 263)
". .. when the question is once raised, it is hard to see how it can be sup-
posed that the consensus of the parties is within the province of law which
must needs regard not the will itself but the will as expressed . . ." Cf.
Leonhard, Der Irrthum bei nichtigen Vertrigen; Windscheid, Lehrbuch des
Pandektenrechts (9th ed., Kipp Ed. igo6) 1, sec. 69 n. Ia.; Williston, Mutual
Assent in the Formation of Contracts, (i919) in Wigmore, Celebration Legal
Essays, p. 525.
" Austin, op. cit. 1. 432: Lecture xix.
s Holmes, The Common Law (88), p. gi.
ACTS
* *, 22 In another place, Austin has said that "acts (prop-
erly so called) are not injuries or wrongs, independently of their
consequences." 23 It is perfectly clear that when a liability is
incurred for a wrongful harm, the liability is not for the act as
aboice defined by Austin and by Holmes. It it also perfectly
dear, on-the contrary, that liability is imposed for having been
in a definite objective relation to a harm. The basis of the-ap-
plication of this liability is the probability of harm flowing from
the muscular movements, or the lack of them, of some person.
No doubt the standard is an idial one varying from case to case
and dependent on the education,' character, and prejudice of
those who apply the standard.24 The standard in all cases is and
must be an objective one even where in the chain of physical
motions there is a psychical gap, as where a master orders his
servant to do an unlawful act or where the owner of a dog
incites the animal by words to attack another.
'If we examine the contents of any specific code we will at
once encounter definitions of this sort:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought.
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice.
Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking and carrying,
leading, riding or driving away of the personal goods of
another.
Robbery is the felonious and violent taking of money,
goods, or other valuable things from the person of another
by force or intimidation.
The crime of murder is not the crooking of a finger, even
though that finger was attached to the trigger of a loaded pis-
tol which was discharged resulting in the death of a human be-
ing. The crime is the killing. Liability is imposed because of
the objective relation of some person who brought it about. If
- Ibid.
"Austin, op. cit. I, 44o: Lecture xx
aCf. Holmes, op. cit. p. St.
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criminal punishment is inflicted for .acts, then it is clear beyond
any doubt that the act is the killing and is not the muscular
movement which preceded it. To accept the Austinian view of
the nature of an act would require a cumbersome rephrasing of
every criminal code.
25
The Austinian analysis confuses two distinct ideas: (i)
acts, the results of muscular movements; and (2) culpability for
these results. The act is the same whether it was willed or not
willed, whether harm or not harm, whether injuria or not in-
juria. 26 The act is the prius; the question of culpability is a
posterius. The act, the factual result, is a datum of the physical
world; liability is a datum of juristic thought. It is an incon-
venient inversion of the order of things, to attempt to isolate
an intermediate act and to connect it to a state of mind on one
side and to certain consequences on the other.27  It is not only
inconvenient to proceed in this way but it is also analytically
confusing to attempt it. The more natural line of inquiry is:
(i) Was there a harmful result?; (2) Is any one accountable
for that harmful result? The first question is answered by
evidence. The second question is answered in part by evidence
showing the objective relation of the actor to the event, and in
part by application of a standard to measure this objective re-
lation.
In the ordinary case of liability the ultimate questions are
generally so obvious that it is of little -practical importance
Markby (Elements of Law, 6th ed., [1905] sec. 215, p. 118), confessedly
follows the Austinian analysis. See, also Cook, W. W., Act, Intention, and
Motive, 26 YALE LAw JoURNAL 645 (1917).
Cf. Beale, Recovery for Consequences of an Act, 9 HARV. L. Rnv. 8,
seq. (1896), cited by Prof. Cook (vide n. 25 ante).
"Austin's definition of 'act is limited to "the bodily movements which
immediately follow our desires of them." Whether Austin means to include
all of the bodily movements supervening between the mental state and the
external result, or only the latest stage of bodily movements preceding the
consequence, is not clear and perhaps also is not important. In other words,
it is not certain whether Austin's definition is a state or a connected series
of staltes; or to put it yet in still other words, whether an act is a point or a
line. As to this inquiry, it is relevant to. notice Salmond's analysis of act
which lke Holland's adopts a linear view. According to Salmond, Jurispru-
dence, (3d ed. 19io, sec. 128) an act is constituted of three elements: ()
origin (mind or body); (z) circumstances; (3) consequences.
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whether we think of liability imposed for consequences of acts
or whether we think of it as imposed for doing acts. The in-
tuition of court-, and legislatures on this point has been sounder
than the prevailing reasoning of jurists. Courts and legisla-
tures impose liability primarily for what is done and only sec-
ondarily for what is caused. It may also be noticed that the
question, What is a crime or tort? is not the same question, now
under discussion, What is an act? The concept, 'crime,' involves
all the objective elements leading up to a harm, but the harm
alone is the 'act' in the proper sense.
If the position above taken is correct, it follows that an act
is simply a certain kind of event. It is a situation of fact which
theoretically may be fully described. Therefore, it has no dura-
tion. It is the last element for purposes of description in a com-
plex chain of other events. Each of these other events also
may be described as an act. They are infinite in number but the
law generally deals only with those that are practically signifi-
cant, such as a bodily wound, economic loss, deprivation of pos-
session, putting in bodily fear, acceptance of an offer, abandon-
ment of an object, death, etc. The law does not usually regard
the series of events leading up to these final events except for- the
purpose, and then only in penal law, of determining the objec-
tive direction of preliminary acts of an evidentiary nature.
II
From the foregoing statement it appears that there are, or
may be, three main types of theory of the nature of an act:
(i) the theory that an act is a muscular contraction (or a con-
nected series of such contractions); (2) the theory that an act
consists of muscular contractions, the surrounding circumstances,
and the consequences; (3) the theory that an act is the result
either of a bodily movement or is a result attributable to its ab-
sence. The last theory is the one. which the present discussion
seeks to support. There are, or may be, subordinate theories un-
der each of these three main groups which predicate an accom-
panying state of mind. There is still another classification of
these theories into two types. (i) the linear type; and (2) the
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point type. This paper adopts the latter (the point type) as the
correct one.
While it is true that in the ordinary case the practical needs
of justice are realized without attempting a thoroughgoing
analysis of the juristic foundations of liability, and while it is
also true in such cases that the courts need not concern them-
selves with the various types of theory above sketched, yet there
are instances where there is no escape from theory even though
it be inarticulate and even though it finds a surrogate in the
sound intuition of the judge.
We believe it has already been sufficiently shown that the
law does not impose liability for an act that consists solely.of a
contraction of the muscles. If liability is imposed, it is because
the contraction of muscular tissue has been followed by a harm-
ful result to some person. The act for purposes of liability is
that harmful result and nothing else. The reason for imposing
liability is that some other person is accountable for that harni-
ful act because of his preceding acts.
If a gate-tender falls asleep at his post and a railroad fa-
tality occurs because of the failure to lower the gates at the
proper, time, the fatality is the (negative) act of the gate-tender.
It is a result for which he is responsible and liability is imposed
because of two other facts: (i) that he acted in assuming the
duties of his employment; and (2) that after so acting he later
failed to act when he ought to have acted.
Positive and Negative Acts. (i) In a narrow sense there
are only positive acts, or, as Austin has put it, simply acts.
28
If there are no bodily movements then there is no act. This
view proceeds from Austin's theory of the nature of an act
According to Austin (op. cit. , pp. 376, 438), there are: (r) acts ("the
bodily movements vhich immediately follow our desires of them") ; (2) for-
bearanzces ("the not doing a giveri act with the intention of not doing it);
omissions ("the not doing a given act, without adverting [at the time] to the
act which is not done"). This classification is logically complete but it offers
three objections: (i) there is no generic name for these three instances of
acting; (2) it relies on a mental factor which cannot be. applied with objec-
tive certainty; (3) it does not correctly or logically describe the 'act' even
if taken in the sense of a bodily movement since the emphasis is wholly on
a state of mind which precedes the bodily movement.
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which disregards in the definition the consequences of acting. It
is a view logically consistent with that theory.
(2) There is another view widely accepted that acts are
positive or negative; they are acts of commission and acts of
omission. "A wrongdoer either does that which he ought not to
do, or leaves undone that which he ought to do." 29 This terminol-
ogy is an improvement over Austin's in that it gives to the
term 'act' a generic meaning. It suffers however, from a serious
defect of its own in that it makes the nature of an act depend
upon an extraneous jural fact, i. e.,' the existence of a duty and
the method of its violation. An attempt to apply this idea,
however, presents difficulties. This may be seen in the follow-
ing illustration.
Primus has a claim to corporal integrity. Every other per-
son owes a duty not to infringe the corporal integrity of
Primus. But the corporal integrity of Primus nmay be in-
fringed by bodily movements of Secundus which have a direct
physical connection with Primus; or the corporal integrity of
Primus may be infringed by the absence of bodily movements
of Tertius which lead to the same harmful result. It is clear
enough that the act of Secundus was one of commission; it is
also clear that the act (if there can be said to be an act) of
Tertius was an act of omission. In other words, the act of
Secundus was a positive act; he did what he ought not to do.
The act of Tertius was a negative-act; he left undone what he
ought to do. So far, there seems to be no difficulty.
But, now, suppose that Sextus infringes the corporal in-
tegrity of Primus by striking him with an automobile. Did
Sextus do what he ought not to do; or did Sextus leave undone
what he ought to do; or, perchance, did Sextus do what he ought
not and also leave undone what he ought to do? We believe
the only escape from this and similar difficulties lies in another
approach.30
' Salmond, op. cit. sec. t28; cf. Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legis-
lation, (789) cap. vii.
' Salmond, (op. cit. sec. 128) seems to limit the application of positive
and negative acts (at least his discussion of the terms is so limited) to acts
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(3) An act can best be defined by considering it objec-
tively and stripping it of all subjective or jural elements. The
s:,me observation holds for the effort to classify acts. Proceed-
ing objectively, an act is a result which is carried back for pur-
poses of legal reasoning to a human being. If the result is one
which is directly connected in a physical chain of sequences with
the bodily movements of a person, then the result is the positive
act of that person. If the result is not so connected then the
result is, asto that person, a negative act. Whether the person
is held accountable for the result, whether as to him positive
or negative, is not here the question. The point is to find a
criterion which has universal objective validity and logicdl co-
herence.
Applying this criterion to the example last considered, there
appears to be no difficulty in saying that if Sextus strikes Pri-
mus while Sextus is driving his automobile, the act is a positive
act although the duty was a negative one, i. e., not to infringe
the corporal integrity of Primus.
Negative acts require to b further classified. They may be
omissive or commissive. If a landowner neglects to warn an
invitee of a hidden danger not created by the landowner, the
harm results from .negative omission. If a master orders "his
servant to commit a tort, as to the servant the act is positive;
as to the master, the act is a negative act of commission. Nega-
tive acts of commission may be direct or indirect. When the mas-
ter orders the servant to commit a tort, the act as to the master
is a negative act of direct commission. Where the master is
responsible for a tort of the servant committed within the scope of
his employment, the act as to the master is a negative act of
indirect commission.
Since several ideas are involved in this analysis it may be
useful, so far as it has any importance, to show the classification
by means of the following diagram.
of wrongdoing; but such a view is inadmissable. The ideas are universal
and apply to all the various kinds of acts in every legal relation. Thus an
act of performance may be either positive or negative. The payment of a
debt is a positive act; the refraining from a trespass is a negative act.
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PosIvE-direct physical connection of force of an actor with
an objective fact (and exceptionally a subjective fact).
ACTS
N'r ECATIVE fL OmissJ~~-¢.( rv .
NI. Cm...-.ssi.ve Direct Involving the intermediation
l Indirect J of an intelligent force.
Negative commissive acts are positive actings by physical
connections of force of intelligent forces (e. g., of men and of
the lower animals, but not of the forces of inanimaie nature),
the results of which are imputable for purposes of responsibility
to another. Acts may be negative and omissive by the inter-
mediation of an intelligent intermediary force (e. g., the negli-
gence of a servant), but in this case there is no need of further
subdivision since such omission can be neither direct nor in-
direct. A crucial illustration of the application of this analysis
may be put as follows: A stretches wire across a public high-
way, holding one end of the wire and B, while passing along
the highway, comes into contact with the wire as a result of
his own motions. What is the objective character of the act?
It would seem to be a negative act of direct commission.
Internal and External Acts. There are three views on this
matter: (i) That there is no distinction between internal
and external acts 31-that there is only one species of act
which involves (a) a psychic content and (b) a physical ele-
ment; 32 (2) that there are internal acts, or ads of the mind,
and also external acts, the latter of which are constituted of
psychic and material elements; " (3) that there are internal acts
'Del Vecchio, The Formal Bases of Law, (Boston 1914) sec. 9o, p. 128;
Austin (op. cit.) I, 433.
' The argument of Schopenhauer, (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,
sec. 18, cited by Del Vecchio, op. cit.) may be noted: "Acts of will and
physical acts are not two distinct things joined in a causal chain; they do not
stand in a relation of cause and effect but are one and the same." As Del
Vecchio puts it, "to hold the relation of the will to its acts as causal is equiv-
alent to saying that will acts upon its acts which is arguing in a circle": Del
xrecchio, op. cit. see. 89, p. 127, n. 7.
' Salmond (op. cit. sec. x28): "Every external act involves an internal
act which is related to it; tut the converse is not true, for there are many
acts of the mind which never realize themselves in acts of the body." Cf.
Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation. (1789) calp. vii. It may be
noted here, although the detail of the matter must be passed over, that Bent-
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and external acts, but that these acts are independent data for
legal purposes. The view of the present writer gives adhesion
to the last view.
If the law for any purpose takes account of reflexes 3 4 stop-
ping short of physical expression, then internal acts accordingly
must be noticed as one of the fields of law. There are many
instances where this appears to be the fact. Some typical in-
stances are estoppel from silence, admissions from silence, tacit
ratification, negligence by omission. •
If a man perceiving the mistake of another who is about
to build on the former's land, stands by, is the act of the land-
owner an internal act? If there is a determination of the will to
remain silent, that determination of the will certainly is an act.
But does the law act upon that-factor? It would seem not to do
so, but rather to operate upon the effect produced on the builder.
It is a case of misrepresentation by passive assistanceP * The
act of the builder was dearly a positive external act. It is also
the landowner's act by iontribution to the result. As to the
landowner therefore, it is also an external act. s Other instances
will submit of a similar analysis with the result that we find that
the law actually deals only with such acts as are represented by
physical situations 6r by mental states flowing from physical
situationsO7 But while this statement is true of the law as it is,
ham (cap. vii) classifies acts into the following groups: (z) Positive and
Negative (substantially in the same sense as shown above); (2) Internal
and External (acts of discourse being a mixture of the two); (3) Transi-
tive and Intransitive; (4) Transitory and Continuing; (5) Divisible and In-
divisible.
, We mie the term in a broad sense to include voluntary or involuntary
movements of mind or matter. In this sense a lunatic, a hypnotic subject.
or one under duress may act. Responsibility in these cases is. another ques-tion.
'Ewart, Principles of Estoppel, (Toronto xgoo) p. 88.
"It may be worth observing that while the act is external, it is as td
the landowner, a negative act. It is a negative act of direct commission.
-Cf. Del Vecchio. op. cit. sec. 95. p. z3. As in the case of mental harms
(if and when actionable). An interesting example of this kind is mental
suffering due to failure to deliver a telegram. Here the act is. the mental
harm; as to the telegraph carrier it is a negative act; it is also an internal
act (or event) as to the person who suffers mentally.
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it is not a necessary result, since conceivably the law might deal
with internal acts if it thought it practicable to attempt it. 8 .
The doctrinal theory, indeed, is that the law does deal with
internal acts. This is seen in all those instances where a state
of mind is premised as a ground of responsibility. Thus for
criminal liability it is generally believed that an 'intent' is neces-
sary. Now this intent can be nothing other than a mental act.
Where knowledge of a fact is assumed to be the foundation of
responsibility whether civil or criminal such knowledge itself
must often be considered as an internal act.89
For example, where there is a non-disclosure of an essential
fact known to one and unknown to another, this non-disclosure
may be due not to an exercise of the will choosing to remain
silent where good faith requires speech, but, on the other hand,
it may be due to indifference, or indecision, or forgetfulness.
This illustration, too, may serve to show how difficult .it neces-
sarily is to base any sort of responsibility on a particular state
of mind.' 0
Acts are the results of human reflexes or the abscnce of
themn. Since animals other than man have the faculty of act-
ing,41 why do we not include the reflexes of the lower animals in
the juristic category of 'acts'? It is true that a dangerous dog
may bite and it is also true that the owner may be responsible
for the harm done by the dog in the same way that he is held
responsible if his servant in the course of his employment harms
another. If what the servant does is an 'act,' why is not what
the dog does also an 'act'?
'Cf. Del Vecchio, op. cit. sec. 95, p. 139.
' Austin's editor, Mr. Robert Campbell, (jurisprudence, 1873, 4th ed. I
427, n. 71) asserts that in spite of Austin's rejection of internal acts, he rec-
ognized 'meditation' as an act. Mr. Campbell then says: "And it is difficult
to see why 'cogito' should not be classed with acts just as much as 'curro' or
*laurio.'"
*Del Vecchio, (op. cii. pp. 13o seq.) shows that ancient psychology treated
will as subordinate to intellect while modern psychology makes will the basic
fact. and this apart from the metaphysical theory of voluntarism. According
to Dlel Vecchio "will and act are esseniially correlative" and will is the pri-
mary and irreducible principle of subjective being."
'r. e., of performing acts.
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. In a wide sense, the term 'act' may include the reflexes and
the result of them of any living organism, 42 but if the technical
meaning is extended beyond the reflexes of human beings there
will be difficulty in drawing the line between animate and in-
animate matter. The result of a stroke of lightning or of a
windstorm, if we disregard the mental element, is as much an
act as a result produced by* the muscles of a man. In order,
therefore, to find a sharp line of logical separation we may in-
dude as 'acts' in the strict sense (a) the results of human re-
flexes; (b) the results legally attributable 43 to the absence
of a human reflex. In the strictest sense only the results of
human reflexes are 'acts.' All other results, no matter whether
flowing from a living organism or not, may be called 'events.'
Both 'acts' and 'events' may be grouped under the tenn 'facts.' "
Our question, however, yet remains unanswered,-why the
actions of the lower animals are not acts in the jural sense. The
proper answer, we believe, is that since, legal relations can subsist
only between persons, no act in a legal sense can be required of
an animal nor can a jural act be projected against an animal.
While the muscular movements of animals could be called acts
in a juristic sense, it would be neither convenient nor desirable
since such movements can never be the content of legal rela-
tions. 5
'The -usage in the application of the terms 'act,' 'acting,' and 'action'
is not settled, and although it has been suggested that an effort to confine
these terms to special functions will be confusing (Salmond, op. cit. Sc 128),
yet we believe that is one of the risks that legal science must take. We
therefore use these terms here in the following way: (z) Act (as already
defined having three senses(: (a) lato sensu, being all attributable results of
the reflexes of living organisms; (b) strict sense, all attributable results of
the reflexes of human beings; (c) strictest sense, the positive acts of human
beings. (2) Acting, the series of concrete movements leading from a de-
fined center whether animate or inanimate to a given result. (3) Actiop, the
same series of phenomena or any one of them considered in an abstract sense.
Cf. Jevons "Elements of logic'" (Hill's ed. New York, 1883) see. 6: "Con-
crete and Abstract Terms";.cf.'Bentham (Principles of Morals and Legis-
lation, [1789] chap. VIII), who employs the term 'action' to include both the
'act' and the consequence.
aWe make no effort here to consider causation and we have avoided
use of the term it; speaking of 'acts."
"Holland, Jurisprudence. (13th ed. 924)- p. 93.




While analysis of the concept 'act' is rarely considered by
the courts, and, in general, is unnecessary, there are two classes
of instances where such analysis is of major importance. The:
first is where the series of facts leading from a human reflex
and ending in a given result or results extends over two or more
territorial jurisdictions. The second is where the legal condi-
tion of the actor undergoes a change before the result is reached.
The first involves a problem of space; the second involves a prob-
lem of time. Some of these problems may now briefly be con-
sidered.
If A in state X" puts in motion a force which strikes B in
state Y and which has a further result (e. g., death) in state Z,
where was the act done? The prevailing common law answer is
that the act is done where the physical contact between the per-
son harmed and the outside force takes place.46  According to
the view taken here, the act is localized at the place where the
result for which liability attaches, occurs. The difficulty has
been in not perceiving that in such cases there are plural acts in-
stead only of one act. If a bullet is fired in state X, that is an
act and there is no theoretical reason why that act should not
subject the actor to liability in state X (if the territorial theory
of liability is to be strictly adhered to) 47 upon a condition sub-
sequent of a given harmful consequence in state Y. or state Z.
4
9
Cf ., Beale, Recovery for Consequences of an Act, 9 H'v. L. Rxv. 82
(i86) ; Goodrich, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 73 U. OF PA. I-
REV. 2z, n. 8. cases (1924); Salmond, (op. cit.) sec. 131: The Place and
Time of An Act.
' It is strictly adhered to in criminal liability upon the view that nd
state will inflict punishment for an act done elsewhere. The theory is also
adhered to in civil liability by a singular confusion of thought. In civil law,
in American jurisdictions, if there is tort liability at the locus commsi,
it is also a tort at the foreign forum if the defendant carries it there: Cf.
Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., 194 U. S. 12o, 24 Sup. Ct. 581 (9o4). In a
word, in cripiinal liability in all jurisdictions, acts and responsibility are local,
but in civil liability in American jurisdictions the act is local but responsi-
bility is a floating one. The English rule. at least as between English
subjects is logically more consistent. By that rule, the act is local but
resnonsibility is not localized with the act. There may be tort liability
in England for an act which is not locally a tort: Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6
Q. B. I.; Machado v. Fontes, 2 Q. B. 231; Scott v. Seymour. x H. & C. 219.
Tin effect, this reasoning is applied in dealing with criminal attempts ex-
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Upon the same basis, if the bullet strikes B in state Y there is
no theoretical reason why state Y should not impose criminal
liability upon A for that act in state Y, and again, state Y might
upon the same ground impose another more extensive liability
for the act in state Y annexed to a condition subsequent of a
further harm elsewhere. And, finally, if death occurs in state
Z, that state might impose 'Criminal liability for that act. The
present rules probably work out with reasonable satisfaction,
since instances which raise these problems do not commonly
occur.
Another difficulty has been presented by the effort to con-
nect a state of mind with one or more of the series or conse-
quences flowing from a reflex. The judicial results at this point
exhibit much confusion and show the need of a logically sound
theory of the nature of 'acts.' 49 An act is an objective fact; it
is a datum of nature to which the law may or may not attach
legal consequenecs. It seems to us quite impossible to say that
if an act is willed it is localized at one place, while if the act is
unwilled it is localized at another place. The act must have the
same situs in all cases without respect to the causes physical or
mental that produced it. The question of responsibility can in
no manner change the nature of the act.
(2) If A puts in motion a force which produces a result
after A's change in legal condition, what is the legal effect, if
any, of the act? The question may arise in contract law, in
tort law, and in crimes. If an infant makes an offer by post
which is received after the infant attains his majority, and is
then accepted, is there an enforcible contract? If A excavates
on his land causing a subsidence on the adjoining land of B,
but after A's death, was there an act? and if so, was it A's
act? and if so, who is responsible? 50 If A at B's request pro-
vides B with poison which B voluntarily takes and B dies, is A
guilty of any criminal act, and if so, what is it?
cept that there is not and can not be a condition subsequent in attempts. Cf.
Beale, Cr.m.nal Attempts, 16 HARv. L REv. 492 (19o3).
'Cf.. Reg. v. Ke~y. 2 Ex. D. 63; Salmond. (op. cit.) sec. 131; Terry,
Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law, (Tokyo 1884) p. 59.
"See Salmond (op. cit.) sec. 131, n. 5.
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If, for these problems, we make an effort to apply the
theory of 'acts' advanced in this paper, we will arrive at the
following results:
(i) If the offer is received after the infant attains his ma-
jority, the act of offer is then complete; it may therefore be
seized upon to constitute an enforcible contract. An acceptance
mailed while the offeror was still an infant but received after
his majority would not be a contract binding the infant. If,
within the period of reasonable time to accept an offer the infant
attains his majority and thereafter the offer is accepted, there
should be a contract. If at the moment of accepting an offer the
offeror is dead, there can be no contract even though there may
be some other form of responsibility.51
(ii) When an adjoining owner's land subsides after the
death of the person who made the excavation, the act or event,
is the subsidence. It is necessary that there be a legal person if
there is an act. There is an act or event (i. e., the subsidence)
by hypothesis, but is there a legal person? It is not sufficient that
there was a legal person. 'Act' and 'person' must be coincident.
There seem to be two possible solutions of the problem:
(a) We may hold the actor liable for the excavation upon a
condition subsequent of harm by the subsidence. That view is
not tenable. It meets the need of having a coincidence of "act"
(i. e., the excavation) and "person"; but it falls in that it im-
poses a liability for an act (i. e., the excavation) which is not
in itself harmful or unlawful. Annexing a condition subse-
quent does not alter the intrinsic nature and quality of the act.
(b) Since neither executors of the actor nor successors in title
can be held liable upon any sound theory, there remains only to
extend the sphere of the actor's person 52 to embrace in point.
of time the culpable act (i. e., the subsidence). That view pro-
"So far as authority may be found on these propositions, it appears to
be highly conflicting, showing contradictions in the theoretical foundations
upon which answers must depend. Cf. Holland, Jurisprudence, (i3th ed.
1924) p. "o seq.
An effort will be made in another paper to justify this solution. For
the present we may say that it involvcs no more of fiction to extend a
legal persona to a dead man than to attribute a legal pcrsona to a live one.
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duces a just result holding the actor's estate liable for the harm
and it avoids the inelegant disruption of act and person.
(iii) Where A at B's request and without inducement on
A's part provides B with the means for accomplishing B's sui-
cide and A not being present, there is no crime either by A or
by B in the absence of a statute specifically dealing with such
a case as put. The act (i. 'e., the death) is not the act of B.5
On the facts stated the act is not that of A.5 4  On different
facts (e. g.,-of inducement) A might be held as a principal, but
A could not be held as an accessory where the rule prevails that
the principal must be triable. At common law, suicide was a
crime punished by indignities to the dead body and forfeiture of
goods. 55  Since death is the act and since the act and a person
must be coincident, it necessarily follows that where suicide is
a crime the legal person must survive, if only for a moment,
the fact of death.
Albert Kocourek.
Northwestern University Law School.
" Terry, Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law. sec. 78, p. 63: "A
person's birth or death is not his act even though the death be by suicide."
a Contra, People v.. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187. 178 N. W. 69o (x92); see
a valuable unsigned comment criticizing this case: 30 YALE L JoUR. 408.
a BI., Com. IV, I89,
